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and some viewed its demise as a propagator of financial unrest.11 But its influence on other banks remains doubtful. First, its failure was known at the time to have been caused by inappropriate (and possibly fraudulent) activities by its management and thus might have had a trivial effect on the perceived risk of other banks' liabilities. Second, its demise preceded by a month the earliest suspensions of banks elsewhere. Finally, banks most directly linked to Ohio Life-correspondent banks in Ohio-were reimbursed at the time of the bank's failure with no loss. Only one bank failed in Ohio during the panic; the others avoided suspending convertibility by credibly coinsuring one another against runs.
The following questions remain about the origins of the panic. What caused banks in eastern cities to suspend convertibility? How could a disturbance with small consequences for banks ex post (one that resulted in few bank failures) cause nearly universal financial disruption and suspension of convertibility? What caused Ohio Life to fail, and how was its failure linked to the general suspension?
Recently, economists have developed models capable of answering the second question. Charles Calomiris and Gary Gorton reviewed these models and argued that during the National Banking Era panics occurred when depositors realized that an important adverse shock had occurred but did not know the precise extent or incidence of the shock among banks.12 Disturbances that instigate panics need not be large relative to aggregate bank capital and need not be expected to result in large numbers of bank liquidations. Periods prior to panics involved unusually bad news about bank assets, including stock price declines, commodity price declines, and increased commercial failures.
Similarly, our explanation for the origin of the Panic of 1857 revolves around the financing of western railroad and land speculation in eastern financial markets. The proximate cause of the panic was the bankruptcy of securities brokers who borrowed from eastern banks to finance their dealings in the stock and bond markets. To understand the panic's origins, one must begin with the economic and political history of the speculative boom and bust in investments in the West during the 1850s.
The function of securities markets changed drastically in the United States in the decade prior to the panic. In addition to state and federal bond issues, investors traded large amounts of securities issued by private companies. These securities consisted mainly of railroad bonds and stocks, and to a lesser extent bank stock, miscellaneous corporate securities, and warrants to western lands. Substantial investment in new roads, financed by a booming market for speculative railroad securities in the East, characterized the early 1850s.13 Different railroads' earnings followed different paths as the course of American development changed over time. By the mid-1850s railroads could be grouped usefully into three categories: eastern roads that served established routes; older western roads built mainly to serve local distribution needs; and newer western roads, sometimes financed through special land grants to serve as trunk lines connecting older areas of settlement and eastern markets with new areas of settlement. As early as 1854, older locally oriented roads in the West found their earnings falling and their opportunities shrinking, as a result of competition from the new trunk lines. These new lines, with their aggressive land-purchasing policies and far-reaching plans for transcontinental expansion, provided the principal speculative opportunities for railroad investors of the 1850s. Their fortunes depended on a continuing inflow of settlers and the growth of commerce on the frontier, which required confidence in the viability of expansion westward.
In the spring of 1857 confidence abounded. The Cincinnati Enquirer reported "railroad fever" associated with the completion of the Southern Illinois Railroad through Ohio, especially the Cincinnati-St. Louis link. 14 According to Allen Nevins, a "fever of speculation in Kansas lands was raging, men selling homes, giving up well paid positions, and even borrowing money at ten percent to purchase farms." Newspapers published along travel routes to Kansas in early 1857 described "a veritable torrent of humanity." The lure of Kansas lands led some to expect Kansas to "increase by seventy thousand people that year." 15 In April settlers arrived at the rate of 1,000 per day.
The link between immigrant traffic and expectations of railroad profitability is visible in the responses to this great influx. As passengers to Kansas increased, the roads lowered rates for through traffic, indicating expectations of a lasting increase in the volume of business (and perhaps the railroads' desire to encourage immigration to stimulate development). They advertised rate reductions of up to 25 percent. Entrepreneurs laid ambitious plans for new railroads. For example, the Leavenworth Herald reported on May 9, 1857, plans to build a railroad to connect with the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad. Entrepreneurs of these projected railroads included important politicians such as Senator Bigler of Pennsylvania, who had a business partner in Fort Scott, Kansas. Bigler's partner had invested in extensive railroad construction, "for he thought [Fort Scott] would become the principal railway center of southwestern Missouri and northwestern Arkansas... Town lots passed through "a dozen hands within sixty days" as speculators looked to a continual influx of settlers and to expanded rail 13 By late summer that optimism was shattered, the value of western land fell and the speculative railroad securities fell with it. Table 1 provides data on various securities for selected dates surrounding the panic and reveals important differences in price movements across different types of securities. Prices were rising or flat from the beginning of 1857 until March, and an upward trend is particularly pronounced for three of the four trunk-line stocks for which data exist for early 1857 and for Ohio Life. Prices remained flat or fell for these stocks from March to the end of May. By late July a substantial depreciation in trunk-line stocks occurred, while other securities' prices remained constant or fell slightly. From July to early September, trunk-line securities, Kansas land warrants, and stock in Ohio Life fell dramatically (Ohio Life suspended on August 24). Meanwhile, the values of other securities show little or no change. The free fall in trunk-line stocks continued up to September 23 with little or no effect on other securities prices. During the onset of the liquidity crisis in early October (after general bank suspension in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, and before suspension in New York), the prices of New York state bonds and eastern railroad stocks declined along with trunk-line stocks. After October 21, recovery began, and by the end of the year (by which time New York banks had resumed convertibility) securities prices were roughly at their September 2 levels. Data from the beginning and end of 1859 show that trunk-line stocks continued on a downward trend after the panic had passed, while other securities followed an upward or flat trend.
The decline in speculative railroads' earnings and prospects forced several companies into default, including the Illinois Central, the Erie & Pittsburgh, the Fort Wayne & Chicago, and the Reading lines. Several thinly capitalized railroad companies-including the Delaware, the Lackawanna & Western, and the Fond du Lac-went bankrupt.
Additional evidence supports the view that mid-1857 represented a turning point in expectations about the profitability of westward expansion. According to Paul Gates, the first Kansas public lands had been put up for sale in 1856 and early 1857, and "for the most part settler-claimants secured the lands" at an average of $1.83 an acre, or approximately 83 cents above that which the settlers who had military warrants had paid.'7 The rapid decline in Kansas land values in 1857 brought foreclosure on mortgaged land and general commercial distress. Thus the asset declines that preceded the panic were confined to a special class -of investments in the West and did not reflect a general rise in securities risk or a contraction of foreign credit. Moreover, these asset declines occurred quickly and were concentrated in mid-1857, with an acceleration of decline from August through mid-September.
What caused the rapid reversal in the perceived profitability of westward expansion? Recent work by James Huston has stressed that the Panic of 1857 coincided with a severe agricultural decline in the Northwest that other regions did not share. 21 Huston suggested that the declining international demand for grain in the aftermath of the Crimean War and the increasing international demand for cotton can explain both the onset of the panic and the regional differences in average growth during this period. Huston The answer may lie in the political struggle between "free soil" and slavery in the territories. Beginning with the Dred Scott decision of March 6-7, 1857, the prospects of free-soil interests deteriorated, and uncertainty about the ultimate status of the territories grew. This reduced the territories' attractiveness to new immigrants, especially from the populous North, and reduced the probability of the establishment of further settlements west of the territories, or of government involvement in a transcontinental railroad through Kansas. Such an explanation is difficult to prove, but the coincidence between political news and securities' price movements is suggestive. The salient political news of 1857 included the Dred Scott decision of March 6-7 (which declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional); a defeat for pro-slavers on April 8 in the St. Louis mayoral election, which led observers to expect the loss of a Senate seat by pro-slavers; the June election of a constitutional convention for Kansas, rigged in advance by the minority pro-slave group; and the anticipation of a legislative election in October, again rigged by proslavers, which was later overturned by the territorial governor. By July Kansas was gripped by political uncertainties that dampened immigration, land speculation, and prospects for railroad expansion. While it is difficult to match political events to securities' price movements convincingly, we note that Kansas land warrant and western railroad securities' prices declined slightly just after the (Table 4) . New York bank stock remained firm until late September. The central puzzle of the panic is the links among the early securities markets' decline, the later decline in bank note prices and bank stocks, and the eventual suspension of convertibility. Why should a region-specific shock to western land and railroads cause a nationwide suspension originating in the East, and why the protracted delay in the reaction of bank note discount rates, bank stock prices, and bank suspension to the JulySeptember decline in land and railroad securities?
In our view, the adverse consequences of the initial "shock" were viewed as small (relative to aggregate bank capital) and were likely confined to only a few banks. Uncertainty about which banks ultimately might fail (given asymmetric information between banks and their depositors) led initially to relatively minor concerns over banks in eastern financial markets, and there was not a large perceived risk of general suspension, even at the time of the suspensions of late September in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington.
Three destabilizing elements combined to transform the securities collapse into a banking panic. First, the initial increase in bank risk prompted some noteholders and depositors in New York state to convert their bank debt into specie. New York's free banks met this demand through sales of bonds in New York, which helped to depress bond prices further. Second, New York banks outside New York City converted their notes into specie mainly through their city correspondents. A regulation of June 1857 regulated city banks' trading in country notes, restricted the discount rate which city banks could charge, and limited the amount of notes that could be returned to peripheral banks without sufficient notice. This regulation, along with rising bank risk, caused a flood of peripheral banks' notes into the city for redemption. This added to the drain of specie from New York City to its correspondents in other eastern financial centers.
Third, as New York City banks came to doubt the solvency of some prominent securities dealers, and as city banks' gold reserves fell in response to the accelerating demand for redemption of peripheral banks' notes, the city banks refused to rollover the debt of the brokers. This forced brokers to sell their bond holdings at rock bottom prices and forced many into bankruptcy. As these bankruptcies mounted, and as securities prices continued to fall, the solvency of New York City banks-whose loans to brokers and dealers often were backed by bonds-came into question. This was the proximate cause of the run on the city banks in mid-October. Thus the declining fortunes of western railroads and declines in western land values, along with a concentration of asset risk and reserve drain in New York City banks, ultimately explain the origins of the panic.
Evidence to support this account comes from securities and bank note prices, flows of funds into and out of the city banks, and the timing of broker failures and bank suspension. By the first week of September, discount rates on bank notes trading in New York City doubled for many banks, but they remained low. They rose from 1 to 2 percent on Ohio banks, and from 1/8 to 1/4 percent on New England banks. Discount rates on Pennsylvania and Maryland banks, and banks in the South, remained unchanged.27 Within the next week, despite a few significant failures by banks and brokers, New York City's banks on the whole "remained unshaken" as "little or no panic had seized depositors or noteholders."28 On September 12 it was learned that the Central America, a ship carrying $1.5 million in gold from California, had sunk en route to New York, but this had little effect on prices.
In the succeeding two weeks, however, with the suspension of banks in Philadelphia, discount rates in New York City rose to levels substantially above normal for banks in every state, indicating an increased fear of possible nationwide suspension. Still, discount rates remained low for most states through the third week of September: 1/4 percent for New England, 3/8 percent for New York banks outside of New York City, 3 percent for most of the South, and 4 percent for Ohio. Interior states generally had higher discount rates, but 10 percent was the maximum observed for any state.29
During September increased risk coincided with conversions of bank debt into specie, but these conversions in New York were not sudden and would not be described accurately as a run. For New York's interior banks there were substantial note redemptions. These took place mainly in New York City, were precipitated partly by a regulatory peculiarity of New York's banking system, and were not associated with substantial default risk. The discounts on interior New York bank notes (except for banks in receivership) never exceeded 1 percent, even after suspension of convertibility in October. But even this small discount justified a large amount of note conversions in the city. Each New York bank was required by law to assign a bank as its agent in New York City (or Albany). The agent was required to maintain convertibility of the bank's notes at no greater than a 1/4 percent discount. City bank agents made markets in interior banks' notes, but were not allowed to return notes to their source without some notice. During normal times market discounts were typically 1/8 or 1/4 percent, so few notes flowed to the city, and they could be returned roughly as quickly as they arrived. When perceived risk rose in September and October, even though only slightly, it justified large flows of notes to the city. Since all New York state banks had to maintain conversion there, it was easy for note arbitragers to bring all interior banks' notes to the city for redemption (rather than carry each note to its home office) and make a profit on the slight difference between the legally required discount rate and the market rate. Because regulation limited the amount that any agent could present for redemption, city banks accumulated large amounts of interior bank notes.
New York City banks did require interior banks to redeem their notes, insofar as they could, but redemptions by peripheral banks took the form of checks on other New York City banks, not specie, and therefore, did not eliminate the specie drain on the city banks. Interior free banks sold their bonds, which had been deposited with the state government as backing for their notes, and used the proceeds (which took the form of checks on city banks) to redeem their notes from their city agents. As the crisis wore on, government regulations on note clearing operated as a destabilizing mechanism for propagating initial uncertainty by draining specie from the country's main banking reservoir, the New York City banks. It also contributed to the declining value of bonds through the increased supply of bonds sold by interior banks to redeem notes. This further exacerbated the risk of brokers whose assets were mainly in the form of securities.
After September 25-when the Bank of Pennsylvania failed, and other Philadelphia banks suspended-specie outflows from New York City banks to redeem interior notes increased. From September 26 to 30 more than $500,000 in notes were redeemed; between October I and 13 some $2 million in interior notes were redeemed. At the time of suspension of convertibility in New York City (October 13), banks there held some $7 million in interior bank notes.30 It is unclear how important New York's note redemption law was in causing the panic. Earlier suspensions in other eastern cities argue against viewing the regulation as an essential cause of suspension. Nevertheless, note redemptions by city banks were a substantial source of reserve outflow in the crucial weeks prior to the panic. City banks struggled to maintain their reserves in the face of a persistent demand for specie and were forced to contract loans. Contraction in city banks' loans and deposits was substantial from August 22 to October 10, particularly as this was normally the season for expansion. Loans fell from $120 million to $102 million, and deposits fell from $89 million to $63 million, while specie reserves increased slightly from $10.9 million to $11.5 million.3' Many city banks' borrowers clamored for assistance. Brokerage houses were particularly needy, but also especially risky, borrowers. It was clear that failure to rollover large amounts of loans coming due on October 4 to these borrowers could have adverse consequences in all financial markets-through its effect on securities prices and consequent effects on call-loan collateral-and so the Clearing House banks of New York City met on September 29 to reassure everyone that such credit would be forthcoming. This promise, however, was not kept due to a combination of the city banks' inability to do so (due to the persistent gold outflow) and their unwillingness to do so (given the rising threat of insolvency for brokers). The contraction of credit forced more and more securities houses into liquidation. On October 3 the respected firm of E.W. Clark, Dodge, and Company failed (in which Jay Cooke was a partner). While discount rates rose and banks contracted, still there was no run. On October 10, however, the surprised New York market saw several railroad companies and the securities firm Corning and Company fail. Corning alone owed several million dollars to the city banks at the time of its failure. Anticipating panic, the Clearing House passed a resolution on October 12 pledging to maintain convertibility. But, like its earlier promise, this was not credible, and depositors' concerns were not allayed.
When New York City banks opened for business on October 13, an unprecedented run by depositors greeted them. Before agreeing to suspend, the banks paid out between $4 million and $5 million. Wall Street literally was filled with depositors hurrying to withdraw their funds. "The banks went down before a storm they could not postpone or resist."32 Between October 1 and October 13 deposits had fallen by $10 million. Roughly half of the specie held by city banks on October 10 was paid out on October 13. In Georgia general bank suspension occurred immediately after that of New York and Charleston, and the motivation was described explicitly as a defensive response to actual and potential pressures from the North.37 Georgia's coastal cities' banks maintained large interbank 32 Cook, "Annual Report," p. 115. 3 The ratio of specie to specie plus interstate deposits was 0.53 on average for Ohio. See Calomiris, "Microeconomic Data." 3" Ecke, "Fiscal Aspects," pp. packages of interior bank currency totaling $7 million, to be redeemed at 20 percent per month, with 6 percent interest payable on the balances held in the interim. This increased bank reserves beyond available specie and made withdrawals from interior banks more orderly and predictable. The plan also sought to satisfy city banks' depositors that city reserve depletion would be reversed.46
TRANSMISSION TO OTHER STATES

Suspension of convertibility in New York
The Clearing House banks set December 11 as the date for resumption for themselves. By acting together they emphasized the collective nature of the problem and their resolve to meet the challenge as a group. Discount rates on interior banks' notes fully rebounded by late November (Table 4) .
Although the Clearing House banks were instrumental in the recovery of the banking system, one might fault them for postponing suspension in the face of massive mercantile failures. Had they suspended in mid-September or even early October, they might have been able to extend the necessary loans to keep the securities market afloat. Focusing on their banks' reputations, rather than the health of the markets as a whole, the bankers chose the path of tight credit, falling prices, and commercial failures.
Of the What is puzzling about these relatively large noteholders' losses for the Safety Fund banks is that their note discounts in New York, Boston, Baltimore, and Philadelphia prior to the panic were identical (indeed, a little lower on average) to those of free banks and individual banks. How can one reconcile the similar evaluation of risk ex ante with the difference in losses ex post? A possible answer is the novelty of the 1857 crisis. As New York's Banking Superintendent pointed out, it was the first banking crisis in the United States of its kind. Earlier financial crises could be traced to the impact of war (as during and after the War of 1812) or to the policies of the Bank of England (which had prompted the Panic of 1837).49 No one had anticipated the course that the panic took. In particular, no one could have anticipated that the New York court would allow interior banks to withdraw all of their bonds on deposit at the banking department in order to redeem their notes. In fact, this was probably illegal, and the request to do so had been denied by the Superintendent prior to the ruling of the court. That ruling allowed free banks to meet the redemption requirement with relative ease, but it did not help the Safety Fund banks, since they did not have bonds on deposit at the banking department. Thus the Safety Fund banks were faced with a more costly convertibility requirement ex post, though neither the origins of the crisis nor the special dispensation for free banks was anticipated ex ante. This may explain the similarity in ex ante risk evaluation of free and Safety Fund banks, even though free banks performed better during the crisis.
Ohio
Ohio provides an interesting example of a banking system that performed well despite the shocks that buffeted western markets. In Ohio from 1856 to 1860 capital-asset ratios rose (from 0.25 to 0.28) for both insured and uninsured banks, and assets did not fully rebound in the two years after the panic. This likely reflects deterioration in Ohio's "fundamentals," rather than the failure of its banks to recover from the crisis. Ohio produced a quarter of the total wheat output of the United States during this period. The Warren-Pearson price index for farm products rose steadily from 59 in 1848 to 95 in 1857, only to fall to the mid-70s in 1858 and remain there for the rest of the decade. At the same time, the price index for all commodities rose from 82 to 111 from 1848 to 1857, and then declined to the mid-90s for 1858-1860. Thus relative farm prices appreciated 19 percent from 1848 to 1857, declined 4.5 percent in 1858, and remained flat until the 1860s. 50 Ohio avoided a general suspension through the cooperation of the network of mutually insured banks, which their (self-)regulator, the Board of Control, orchestrated. Ohio banks were especially vulnerable in 1857 because many of them had substantial eastern deposits on account with Ohio Life. Also, the law bound each member of the insured system to redeem the notes of all member banks, making each In Alabama a small number of mainly urban banks cooperated during the crisis. Total deposits due from banks rose for the four banks in existence from 1857 onward, from $665,000 to $1.03 million from the beginning of 1857 to the beginning of 1858, while total deposits due to these banks fell from $703,000 to $564,000. This rise in net deposits due from banks may reflect the difficulty of obtaining funds from some out-of-state banks. The small percentage fall in deposits due to other banks (relative to public deposits) reflects cooperative behavior among Alabama's banks. Large banks (the Bank of Mobile and the Southern Bank of Alabama) doubled their balances due from other banks and reduced balances due to other banks by over $400,000. The Bank of Montgomery began 1857 with a net balance of interbank claims of 57 Huston, Financing an Empire, vol. 1, pp. 113-14.
-$100,000 and ended it with a net balance of -$386,000. Similarly, in Georgia changes in interbank balances also indicate cooperative behavior. The three largest banks (the Georgia Railroad and Banking Co., the Central Railroad and Banking Co., and the Bank of the State of Georgia) increased their interbank balances by a total of $1.14 million, mainly by paying debts due to other banks.
An analysis of aggregate interbank balances of southern states in 1857 and 1858 suggests interbank transfers across, as well as within, state lines. In 1857 Virginia and Louisiana banks called in large amounts of deposits and borrowed heavily from other southern states in response to the crisis. New Orleans banks began 1857 with a positive net interbank balance of $5.4 million. By the beginning of 1858 the banks had reduced their net interbank balance to $2.7 million. Virginia's aggregate interbank balance fell from $1.7 million to $1.1 million over the same time. These negative changes in net interbank balances were offset by opposite changes in Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and Tennessee. From September 1857 to March 1858, South Carolina reduced its out-of-state interbank balance by roughly $500,000. Georgia went from a $300,000 net debt in the beginning of 1857 to a $400,000 net credit by October of 1857, though nonreporting banks make it difficult to say whether this reflected changes across state lines. Tennessee's change was roughly $1 million, and Alabama's $600,000. This indirect evidence indicates a reallocation of bank balances across state lines, possibly to support troubled banks. Suspension did not close the banking system; rather, it gave banks flexibility to allocate reserves according to need.
Cooperative behavior among southern banks goes back at least as far as the Panic of 1837, as Thomas Govan discussed in his study of Georgia. He found that early calls for suspension came from merchants, and that such local concerns translated into state-and regional-level banking policy by meetings and explicit arrangements among bankers. 58 The reliance on large branching banks in the South facilitated ad hoc cooperative planning. Contemporaries noted that the small number of large banks made it easier to cooperate. The banks of New Orleans and Kentucky and the insured banks in Indiana maintained convertibility during the Panic of 1857, and as Bray Hammond noted, New York state banks could not because they had many more players to coordinate.59 Also, in banking systems with many geographically isolated banks, the costs of monitoring other coalition members' actions to enforce selfregulation is higher, and the benefits of monitoring are spread too thinly among many banks to permit incentive-compatible cooperation. In regional negotiations, like those described by Govan, the large branching banks could speak confidently on behalf of all banks in their state 58 Govan, "The Banking and Credit System," pp. 15-19. 59 because they had the ability to enforce cooperative behavior.601n this light, the coordination of northern banks through formal institutions like city clearing houses and deposit insurance systems can be viewed as necessities in the North, which followed from its reliance on unit banking.61In addition to the benefits of coordination, branching also brought stability by enhancing opportunities for diversification. As the experiences of New York, Ohio, Georgia, Tennessee, and Virginia demonstrate, small unit banks were most vulnerable.
The importance of coordination in limiting bank suspension and failure is reflected in comparisons within and across states during the panic. Ohio's banks, Indiana's coinsuring banks, and southern branch banks in the Carolinas, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia outperformed unit banks-in particular Indiana's and Tennessee's unit free banks. Furthermore, as Table 2 shows, Ohio, Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia suffered commercial distress during the panic equal to or in excess of that of Tennessee, but with far fewer bank failures. Our analysis of antebellum bank performance contrasts with that of Arthur Rolnick and Warren Weber, who viewed the causes of bank failures as exogenously determined by declines in asset values.62We would add to their analysis the potential for banking systems to limit the declines in asset values and to reduce the effects of such declines through cooperation.
